Chapter 1

"These are Revolutionary Times"

Human Rights, Social Justice, and Popular Protest

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Although social justice education in the U.S.A. is frequently historicized in terms of the Civil Rights Movement and twentieth-century protest movements, it also is historically tied to the twentieth-century's human rights initiatives. These human rights pioneers—the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN's Human Rights Commission members—are social justice ancestors usually ignored in our American context but whose efforts have indelibly influenced and shaped social justice efforts in the U.S.A. In fact, this history makes clear that the mid-century human rights initiatives were part of a transnational movement for social justice. Reframing social justice education in terms of human rights gives clarity to our work as social justice educators: It strengthens a vision of education as central to promoting human rights and social justice, it refocuses attention not only on civil rights but also social and economic rights, and it explicitly contests our current context of globalization and neoliberal educational reform.

> "In these days of difficulty, we Americans everywhere must and shall choose the path of social justice . . . the path of faith, the path of hope, and the path of love toward our fellow man."
>
> *—Inscription at the FDR National Memorial, Washington, D.C., from a campaign speech on October 2, 1932, in Detroit, Michigan*

The latter half of the twentieth century in the United States is widely recognized as a period of popular protest and uprising against social injustice. While demands for equality were not universal—as evinced, for example, by the strength of conservative Republicanism under Presidents Nixon and Reagan—this period is nonetheless marked by vocal and organized calls for greater social justice. Often—and somewhat inaccurately—this attention to justice and equality is traced back to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Despite earlier decades' struggles for civil rights, it is the successes and failures of the mid-century that are narrated in the popular imagination as spawning later social justice movements, including the Women's Rights Movement, the Gay Rights Movement, the American Indian Movement, the Black Nationalist Movement, the labor campaigns typified by the United Farm Workers' struggles under the leadership of Cesar Chavez, and the Disability Rights Movement. These struggles continue into the twenty-first

century: In the face of the continuing specter of racism and social inequality, we have seen, for example, mass protests such as the 2006 Day Without an Immigrant marches and the post-September 11 attention to protecting civil liberties and ending racial and religious profiling. Together, these make up what could be deemed a social justice movement.

This is, however, all well-trod territory. Whether looking at a high school history textbook on twentieth-century American history, Howard Zinn's (2005) *A People's History of the United States,* popular media attention to the legacies of the 1960s (e.g., Darman, 2007; Time, 1988), or even in James Banks's (2004) oft-cited history of multicultural education, the history and effects of the aforementioned protest movements are well discussed in both popular and scholarly literature. Given this well-known civil rights timeline—and given its inattention to the social justice work of earlier decades—we instead want to historicize social justice education in a new context. To do this, we will look to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1945–1951), which itself drew on the social justice efforts of earlier movements and time periods while also becoming an antecedent manifesto and foundation for later movements.

Born of a historical moment when the world was explicitly concerned with protecting social justice (Morsink, 1999), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) affords a unifying and global conception of justice. By delving into the history of the UDHR,[1] we argue that (1) this is in fact a social justice manifesto, and (2) this social justice manifesto continues to shape global discourse about justice, equity, and social responsibility. Next, we turn back to the aforementioned protest movements to show how our contemporary notions of justice and equality—however unrealized they may be—are rooted in the ideals of the UDHR. We then connect the UDHR and the social justice ideals of subsequent protest movements to contemporary ideas of social justice education. Finally, we will look at the ways that these twentieth-century conceptions of justice compel twenty-first-century attention to globalization.

Our ultimate hope is not to present a monolithic, over-simplified history of social justice—we know, for example, that another side to this story is America's elevation of property rights above all other rights (Harris, 1993; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995). We recognize that there are multiple social justice histories, each impartial on its own; our goal is not to present The History, but to stimulate discussion about the many roots of our work, which too often remain a mirage. As British-born economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek's asserts, "[W]hole books and treatises have been written about social justice without ever offering a definition of it. It is allowed to float in the air as if everyone will recognize an instance of it when it appears" (Novak, 2000, p. 11). This chapter attempts to pull social justice history back down to earth.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a Social Justice Manifesto

The Historical Context: Confronting Injustice and Promoting Human Rights in the United Nations

In the first half of the twentieth century, the world was confronted with injustice, aggression, and economic collapse on a massive scale. In the wake of social cataclysm—including two world wars, the Great Depression, and the dismantling of colonial empires—there was unprecedented international attention to the cause of social justice and the codification of a universal moral code (Glendon, 2001; Ishay, 2004; Morsink, 1999). In fact, Woodrow Wilson, in his 1918 "Fourteen Points Address" calling for the creation of the League of Nations, declared the need for an international body devoted to protecting and promoting social justice (Ishay, 2004). However, this call was not realized until after World War II, when the war's tragedies—including the Jewish Holocaust[2]—cemented the need for an international mandate to intervene on behalf of justice (Morsink, 1999). A few weeks after Germany's 1945 surrender, 51 nations signed the United Nations Charter, finally realizing Wilson's call (Glendon, 2001).

Explicit in the UN's Charter were four goals: to prevent future wars; to establish international justice; to promote social progress and improved standards of living; and "to affirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small" (UN, 1945, Preamble). This affirmation of human rights is often seen as a pragmatic approach to justice, a tool outlining minimum standards of human dignity, a tool whose use could move the world towards greater justice socially, economically, and politically (Appiah, 2003; Ignatieff, 2003; Koenig, 1997; Mower, 1979). While human rights themselves are certainly not *guarantees* of social justice (Gutmann, 2003), they are essential tools for working towards it (Carolan, 2000).

Indeed, the early years of the UN's existence were marked by a near-singular attention to codifying this human rights—and, by extension, social justice—agenda (Morsink, 1999). Three months after its founding, the UN articulated the Nuremburg Principles, which would be the guiding principles in the prosecution of Nazi war criminals during the Nuremburg Trials. The Nuremburg Principles—and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that grew out of them—were the UN's first human rights treaties, written in direct response to what was seen at the time as an ultimate act of social *in*justice and a cataclysmic violation of human rights, the Holocaust (Ishay, 2004; Morsink, 1999).

The next human rights initiative was undertaken during the UN's first General Assembly meeting in January 1946, when it established a Human Rights Commission whose primary task would be to author an international bill of rights (Glendon, 2001). The U.S.A.—particularly Franklin Delano Roosevelt—heavily influenced this work (Glendon, 2001; Hareven, 1968; Mower, 1979). In his "Four Freedoms" speech, FDR declared world peace to be founded on four freedoms:

> The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.
>
> (Roosevelt, 1941)

These "four freedoms" are widely seen at providing the UN's core human rights framework (Anderson, 2003; Glendon, 2001; Ishay, 2004; Johnson, 1987; Mower, 1979); in fact, protecting these "four freedoms" was explicitly named in the Atlantic Charter as a justification for U.S. involvement in World War II (Anderson, 2003). The "four freedoms" importantly hit on two central points in the consideration of human rights: one, that the rights to be protected were both civil/political and economic/social; and two, that international peace was itself a human right (Mower, 1979). What's more, these "four freedoms" reflect FDR's domestic vision of an economic and political system more just than unbridled capitalism—economic freedom meant more than the freedom of markets; it meant that individuals should be *guaranteed* a "freedom from want" (Ishay, 2004). FDR advocated for government guarantees of certain economic rights, including job protection, economic security, and the sharing of economic and scientific progress (Roosevelt, 1944). Moreover, FDR explicitly named this vision "choosing the path of social justice," as commemorated at his own memorial in Washington, DC.

It was, however, Eleanor Roosevelt as chair of the Human Rights Commission who ensured that the UN lived up to this vision (Glendon, 2001; Johnson, 1987; Mower, 1979). At the time, Roosevelt was considered by dominant American society to be an outspoken advocate for social justice and civil rights—serving as a board member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), setting up a controversial concert for Marian Anderson at the Lincoln Memorial, defying Jim Crow in Southern establishments (Anderson, 2003). She, like her husband, saw social responsibility and social justice as fundamental to world peace:

> [T]he basis of world peace is the teaching which runs through almost all the great world religions: 'Love your neighbor as yourself' . . . [W]hen we center on our own home, family, or business, we neglect this fundamental obligation of every human being, and until it is acknowledged and fulfilled, we cannot have world peace.
>
> (in Mower, 1979, p. 20)

As the founder of Human Rights Day, leader of the UDHR drafting, and international advocate for human rights, Eleanor Roosevelt left an indelible mark on our

understanding of human rights and social justice (Glendon, 2001; Johnson, 1987; Morsink, 1999; Mower, 1979).

Codifying Human Rights and Social Justice in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

> "[The UN members] believe that men and women, all over the world, have the right to live . . . free from the haunting fear of poverty and insecurity. They believe that they should have . . . more complete access to the heritage . . . of civilization so painfully built by human effort. They believe that science and the arts should combine to serve peace and the well-being, spiritual as well as material, of all men and women without discrimination of any kind. They believe that . . . the power is in their hands to advance . . . this well-being more swiftly than in any previous age."
>
> —*"The Grounds of an International Declaration of Human Rights" (UNESCO, 1949, p. 259)*

The initial work of the Human Rights Commission strongly pushed to define human rights primarily in terms of racial anti-discrimination, largely as a response to the Holocaust—a genocide fueled by overt racial and ethnic hatred (Morsink, 1999). This focus was widely supported by delegates from the Philippines, Egypt, India, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, France, the Soviet Republics, Latin America, and even Roosevelt herself (Glendon, 2001; Hareven, 1968). In fact, in its survey of the world's rights traditions, UNESCO (1949)[3] found anti-discrimination and the acceptance of difference to be one of the most common refrains.

This emphasis on anti-discrimination reflects the UDHR's grounding in empathy and morality. In fact, an early draft written by French delegate and Nobel Peace Prize-winner René Cassin was written not to take political sides in the burgeoning Cold War, but rather to articulate common international moral standards. This moral stance was clarified by Chinese philosopher and delegate P. C. Chang, who proposed the Chinese symbol *ren*—which roughly translates to "two-man mindedness" and evokes empathy and compassion—as the overarching human rights principle (Glendon, 2001). Indeed, the very will to declare human rights was, according to Lebanese delegate Charles Malik, "about an international moral will" (Glendon, 2001, p. 86).

From Wilson's initial call for the promotion of social justice to the explicit discussion of justice in its Charter, one of the UN's moral stands was focused on advocating for and working toward the ultimate goal of social justice (Ishay, 2004). Parties as diverse as Syria, who called for the inclusion of social justice in the UDHR (Glendon, 2001), and Eleanor Roosevelt, who saw the UN's mission as furthering social justice (Hareven, 1968), advocated for this vision. This is certainly *not* to say that all nations were equal advocates for social justice. To the contrary, the most powerful governments—the U.K., the USSR, the U.S.A.—strongly resisted human rights, particularly when they challenged domestic policies. In the end, however, other nations—China, Syria, India, Argentina—banded together to insist on its

pre-eminence in the UN's mission (Anderson, 2003; Glendon, 2001; Johnson, 1987; Morsink, 1999; Mower, 1997).

As understood by the UN delegates, human rights led to social justice by challenging unequal hierarchies of power, amplifying the voices of the weak, and eliminating poverty, discrimination, and exploitation—the root causes of conflict (Glendon, 2001; Ishay, 2004; UNESCO, 1949). President Truman described this nexus of concerns at the signing of the UN Charter: "Experience has shown how deeply the seeds of war are planted by economic rivalry and *social injustice*" (emphasis added; Glendon, 2001, p. 238). Over forty years later, Secretary General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali echoed Truman in his description of the UN's primary aim as "address[ing] the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression" (in Andreopoulos, 1997, p. 11). This attention to economic inequality, unequal power hierarchies, and political oppression remain the focus of twenty-first century social justice and human rights work, including within education.

What, then, are the specific rights guaranteed by the UDHR that move the world toward greater social justice? Roughly, the UDHR included two categories of rights—political/civil and social/economic—and they strongly reflected FDR's "four freedoms": "freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want [have] been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people" (UN, 1948b, Preamble). Furthermore, the UDHR declared the equality of all humans by guaranteeing the right to self-determination and freedom from tyranny, oppression, and exploitation. Human rights scholar Michael Ignatieff (2003) argues that these freedoms—to self-determination and from oppression—are deeply linked: "We know from historical experience that when human beings have defensible rights—when their agency as individuals is protected and enhanced—they are less likely be abused and oppressed" (Ignatieff, 2003, p. 4). *All* persons—regardless of race, nationality, creed, gender, age, religion, or any other identity status—were granted international rights to challenge injustice, barbarism, and oppression.

In its 30 articles, the UDHR outlaws slavery, servitude, torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, and interference in private matters. It affirms equal recognition and protection before the law, fair trials domestically and internationally, and innocence until proven guilty. It guarantees freedom of movement, residence, speech, religion, thought, and opinion. It also guarantees the right to asylum, to a nationality, to marry and have a family, to own property, to change one's religion, to participate in government, to social security, to work at the job of one's choosing, to be paid an equal and living wage, to organize and join trade unions, to ample rest and leisure, to an adequate standard of living (with specific reference to food, clothing, housing, medical care), to free and compulsory elementary schooling, to an education that promotes human rights and allows for self-actualization, to participate in the cultural life of the community, and to international peace (United Nations, 1948b, Articles 1–30). The UDHR attempts to protect these rights by articulating what governments must *do* and guarantee in order to foster a minimum level of social, political, and economic equality.

As is clear from this catalogue of guarantees, the UDHR conceived of human rights far more broadly than traditional Western civil rights. In what was seen as a radical departure from the Western rights tradition, which focused only on personal liberties, the UDHR included rights for economic opportunity, protection, and development (Glendon, 2001; Ishay, 2004; Johnson, 1987; Richardson, 2000). While early drafts took these largely verbatim from the 1948 Bogota Conference's Pan-American Declaration of Rights—a document in the dignitarian rights tradition rather than the civil rights tradition[4]—they also directly reflected the Roosevelts' conceptions of social justice (Glendon, 2001). For example, in FDR's 1944 State of the Union address, he outlined his "second bill of rights," which would ensure for every citizen a good education; a useful and remunerative job; a wage capable of meeting basic needs; adequate medical care; basic protection from the fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; and the right of every family to a decent home (Roosevelt, 1944).

This unlikely combination of two rights traditions on opposite sides of the Cold War battle ground—civil and political rights associated with the liberal/democratic tradition of the West and social and economic rights with the socialist/communist tradition of the East—is evidence of the Human Rights Commission's understanding of the role of social inequality in fomenting aggression. Reiterated throughout drafting were the assertions that political independence and economic sovereignty go hand in hand, that international security and civil rights depend on economic justice, and that genuine justice ensures an individual's personal *and* economic security (Glendon, 2001; Ishay, 2004; Morsink, 1999; UNESCO, 1949). In this, human rights offers a broader framework for social justice than civil rights (Anderson, 2003).

The UDHR also goes beyond civil rights in its inclusion of not merely *rights* but also *responsibilities* (Glendon, 2001; Ishay, 2004; UNESCO, 1949; Morsink, 1999). In Western rights theory, the role of the state is usually limited to ensuring that individual liberties (e.g., to speech, to property) are not compromised. However, in the UDHR, the state is responsible for actively providing for the economic and social welfare of its citizens—through the guarantees of equal wages, decent housing, and social services. Whereas the civil rights tradition might simply guarantee an individual the right to work if jobs are available, the UN's articulation of human rights would instead guarantee that any individual who wants to work *will* work and, what's more, will be given equal pay for equal work, earning enough for an adequate standard of living. In this, the government does more than protect against intrusions on individual liberty; the government guarantees a certain standard of living. This was a widely supported rights philosophy (Glendon, 2001; Ishay, 2004), one that emphasized collective responsibility. Perhaps Mahatma Gandhi (UNESCO, 1949) explained this most famously:

> I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to be deserved and preserved came from duty well done. Thus the very right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world. From this one fundamental statement, perhaps it is easy enough to define the duties of Man and

> Woman and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be first performed. Every other right can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for. (p. 18)

Fundamentally, human rights are not just *rights*, but responsibilities to uphold (Ishay, 2004).

Working in the "Small Places": Promoting Human Rights and Social Justice via Education

> "Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the UN for the maintenance of peace."
>
> —*The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26.2*

The UDHR guarantees for all people the right to education. While early drafts limited this to free and compulsory elementary education, by the final Declaration, education had been given a prominent role in fostering respect for human rights. The Preamble itself names education as *the* vehicle for promoting human rights: "[T]his Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . shall strive *by teaching and education* to promote respect for these rights and freedoms" (emphasis added; UN, 1948b). The emphasis on education as the arbiter of human rights reflects one of the many compromises made about the role of the state in protecting human rights (Glendon, 2001). Even American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles—who was one of the staunchest opponents of the entire human rights project, along with President Eisenhower, under whom he served—argued that it was the role of *education* (and not governments) to foster a human rights culture (Anderson, 2003; Hareven, 1968). In fact, UDHR drafter Cassin attributed more power to education than legal tribunals: "Legal force of itself is only a secondary safety valve: it is the education of young people and even of adults that constitutes the primary and real guarantee for minority groups faced with racial hatred that leads so easily to violence and murder" (in Osler & Starkey, 2000b, p. 94). In the view of the UDHR drafters, only education could cultivate a global human rights culture. No government, no law, and no war could cultivate respect for human dignity and difference the way that a human rights education could.

Indeed, the UNESCO philosopher's survey (1949) revealed near global unanimity that education should "facilitate the mutual understanding of the peoples of the world" (p. 269) and ready citizens for their governmental and social responsibilities, including the protection and promotion of social justice. By promoting the human right to education as something more than compulsory and free elementary education, the UDHR drafters seemed to answer educator I. L. Kandel's challenge of whether human rights education would be "education for acquiescence or education for freedom" (UNESCO, 1949, p. 223)—whether human rights education would encourage critical thought about human rights and unequal power structures or

maintain allegiance to the status quo. In the end, the UDHR—with the support even of human rights opponents—came down on the side of "education for freedom."

Human Rights Muddles and the Cultural Imperialism of the UDHR

While the UDHR attempts to be a universal document guaranteeing the rights of all, there are problems with this vision of justice. For example, the UDHR is frequently critiqued for promoting a compromised vision of justice, a vision warped by Cold War politicking and, as a result, a vision that fails to protect the weak and oppressed (Anderson, 2003; Glendon, 2001; Morsink, 1999). Human rights are also critiqued for the American exceptionalism embedded in them—the American idea, present during the drafting process and continuing today, that human rights are only for export and that American life is above international rebuke (Jenkins & Cox, 2005). Additionally, the human rights framework is strongly critiqued by feminist legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon (1993) for ignoring the specific rights and needs of women.

Perhaps most worrisome, however, is the critique of the UDHR as culturally imperialist. It is increasingly common for the very notion of 'universal' human rights to be critiqued as a fundamentally Western perspective that invalidates the right to cultural and political self-determination (Burke, 2006; Glendon, 2001; Howard, 1997/8; Ishay, 2004). In addition to the argument that universal rights themselves are a Western imposition, it is also argued that the supremacy of the civil/political and social/economic rights of the individual over any kind of collective rights reflects Western priorities (Howard, 1997/8)—a bias that continues to beg justification in current discourse (e.g., Appiah, 2003; Ignatieff, 2003; Rawls, 1993). These cries of cultural imperialism were further justified when powerful UN members denied colonial territories' demands for human rights and independence (Ishay, 2004). Human rights were universal, it seemed, so long as their protection did not challenge traditional power structures.

Although the human rights framework did stem, in part, from an American vision, it was actually the other, less powerful members of the UN who became its most outspoken advocates (Mower, 1979). In fact, it was *China*—included in a UN founding conference as a token gesture—who pushed for the explicit inclusion of human rights, justice, and racial equality in the Charter. The three other conference participants—the U.S.A., the U.K., and the USSR—fought these references (Anderson, 2003). China was loudly joined by political and philosophical leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi (India), Carlos Romulo (Philippines), Charles Malik (Lebanon), Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Léopold Senghor (Senegal), and even African American scholar W.E.B. DuBois in declaring the need for *universal* human rights (Ishay, 2004).

The aforementioned UNESCO philosophers' survey (1949) additionally confirmed that these rights were *universal* human rights. Although the codification of rights was historically a Western undertaking (e.g., the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of the Rights of Man), UNESCO found that, "where basic human values are concerned, cultural diversity had been exaggerated . . . a core of fundamental

principles was widely shared in countries that had not yet adopted rights instruments and in cultures that had not embraced the language of rights" (Glendon, 2001, p. 222). Chang, for example, strongly argued that rights were for everyone, not just Westerners (Glendon, 2001); Chung-Sho Lo (UNESCO, 1949) spoke of the Confucian responsibility of fulfilling duties to one's neighbors; and Humayan Kabir (UNESCO, 1949) discussed Islam as a model of human rights. When drafting the UDHR, the Human Rights Commission was deliberate about including these diverse voices and traditions. In fact, the earliest drafts were strongly influenced by the 1948 Pan-American Declaration of Rights and included rights from the constitutions of Scandinavia and the Soviet Republics as well as from Asian philosophy; later drafts included the perspectives of Asia and the Middle East.

However, save for South Africa, there was no African representation during these foundational meetings; most of Africa was still under colonial yoke (Morsink, 1999). By the time of the Covenants, however, independent African nations played a prominent role in writing these treaties (Hareven, 1968). What's more, 22 different postcolonial, African constitutions make explicit mention of human rights, which also figure prominently in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (Mower, 1979). In fact, the language of human rights was central in anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. Even at the 1955 Bandung Conference, one of the first gatherings of what would subsequently come to be called the "Third World," human rights were critical for *challenging*—rather than perpetuating—Western imperialism (Burke, 2006).

What is blatantly missing from the UDHR is any guarantee of minority or group rights (Burke, 2006; Howard, 1997/8; Morsink, 1999). For the postcolonial world, cultural and group rights have been intricately linked to the right to self-determination—at the heart of the Covenants. During the UDHR drafting process, there was significant pressure to guarantee minority rights. Malik even proposed including the statement, "Cultural groups shall not be denied the right to free self-development," but it was defeated by both North and South Americans (Glendon, 2001, p. 119). Eleanor Roosevelt—despite publicly recognizing "the evils that underdeveloped nations are trying to correct" (Emblidge, 2001, p. 185)—argued that minority rights didn't apply in the Americas because of what she called the "assimilationist ideal": "[P]eople who come to [American] shores do so because they want to become citizens of our countries. They leave behind certain economic, religious, and social conditions that they wish to shed and prefer to be assimilated into the new country that they are adopting" (Glendon, 2001, p. 161). In the end, the Americans won: there is no guarantee of group rights in the UDHR.

Human Rights, Popular Protest, and Social Justice in the Late Twentieth Century

A New International Language of Justice

> "There are two sides to the human rights program. Freedom of expression, freedom of worship, freedom of suffrage. But much closer to the people in the new world is the question of something to eat and a better life."
>
> —*Eleanor Roosevelt (Johnson, 1989, p. 36)*

As already detailed, the first half of the twentieth century and, in particular, the immediate post-World War II context were a time explicitly concerned with social justice. By looking to this history, we see that social justice was broadly conceived as the protection of both individual liberties and economic security in order to promote world peace. Most central to this period's conception of social justice was an awareness of inequality, brutality, and oppression, and implicit in this was the honoring and valuing of diverse cultural, political, and religious views. Finally, conceptions of justice were fundamentally guided by empathy, morality, and a sense of social responsibility. Human rights were the specific guarantees—for example, to equal pay, an adequate standard of living, or the freedom of thought—that could promote this vision of social justice the world over. In turn, this vision—which is more comprehensive than American civil rights—"lent wings to movements that would soon bring down colonial empires" (Glendon, 2001, p. xvi). Indeed, these human rights documents—by codifying an international language for describing oppression, inequality, and brutality—provided oppressed peoples with a new framework for speaking out for justice and equality. Despite modern-day critiques of human rights as culturally imperialist, the language of human rights has nevertheless fueled "colonial revolutions abroad and the civil rights revolution" in the U.S.A. (Ignatieff, 2003, p. 6).

In fact, by the 1950s, world leaders from Africa and Asia were some of the strongest proponents of human rights—as seen, for example, in their prominence at the 1955 Bandung Conference (Burke, 2006). Despite the compromises and Western worldview embedded within, the *language* of human rights was a powerful tool for challenging imperial domination and domestic discrimination: South African Moses Kotane used human rights to condemn apartheid; Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Senegal's Léopold Senghor referred to human rights in their calls for African independence; and the Philippines' Carlos Romulo used human rights to point to the tyranny of domestic elites (Burke, 2006). Leaders for justice the world over—from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Pope John XXIII—seized the language of human rights (Glendon, 2001).

Human Rights and the American Civil Rights Movement

> "The time has arrived for the Democratic Party to get out of the shadow of states' rights and walk . . . into the bright sunshine of human rights."
>
> *—Minneapolis Mayor and eventual Democratic presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey, at the 1948 Democratic National Convention (Anderson, 2003, p. 124)*

Human rights were deeply connected with the Civil Rights Movement. In the immediate post-World War II context, the NAACP looked to link the struggle for African American equality and justice at home to the global struggle against imperialism and for human rights (Anderson, 2003). As Executive Director Walter White noted in 1944, African Americans took "literally the shibboleths of the Four Freedoms . . . [and] they intend[ed] to secure and enjoy those freedoms and to put

an end to the old order in which men, solely because they are colored, can be worked to exhaustion, exploited, despised, spat upon and derided by those whose chief right to sovereignty is whiteness of skin" (Anderson, 2003, p. 17). The "four freedoms"—as articulated in FDR's State of the Union address, the Atlantic Charter, and eventually the UDHR itself—went beyond civil rights by naming specific human rights, including the right to an equal and living wage, the right to an education promoting citizenship and self-actualization, the right to adequate health care, the right to move freely and to choose one's residence, the right to a decent standard of living, and the right to marry whomever one wants (UN, 1948b). These social and economic rights were a "lifeline" for those mired in the injustices of Jim Crow (Anderson, 2003, p. 137).

What's more, the UDHR drafting process revealed the power of human rights language to shame America's discriminatory practices. Throughout drafting, both the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union regularly used the language of human rights to call attention to one another's Cold War hypocrisies. The Soviets drew particular attention to the U.S.A.'s oppressive treatment of African Americans: By pointing out everything from unequal wages and segregated housing to lynchings and police brutality, the UDHR became an explicit language of rights with which the U.S.A. could be called to task. In fact, using the language of human rights, the U.S.A. was named as the same kind of discriminatory state as the burgeoning apartheid regime of South Africa (Anderson, 2003; Dudziak, 2000; Glendon, 2001; Hareven, 1968; Ishay, 2004; Johnson, 1987).

A human rights framework also supported post-World War II fights for equality. For example, returning black veterans launched the "Double V" campaign of World War II—"Victory at home, victory abroad"—in which they linked their fight for justice and democracy in Europe to the fight for African American equality at home. The NAACP also challenged Winston Churchill's 'racing' of the four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter—he claimed that these freedoms were for whites only—by demanding a seat at the negotiating table of the UN. Using the language of human rights even empowered African American leaders to challenge President Truman's belief that African Americans wanted "justice, not social equality" (Anderson, 2003, p. 2) by arguing that social and economic equality were necessary correlates for social justice.

In addition, African American organizations thrice petitioned the UN to intervene on behalf of the U.S.A.'s human rights violations against African Americans: the National Negro Congress's 1946 petition, *A Petition to the United Nations on Behalf of 13 Million Oppressed Negro Citizens of the United States of America;* the NAACP's 1947 petition, *An Appeal to the World;* and the Civil Rights Congress's 1951 petition, *We Charge Genocide.* All three petitions were an attempt to lift the struggle for racial equality and justice in the U.S.A. to an international arena, both because such an international focus might pressure the U.S.A. into taking greater action at home and because it explicitly connected the struggle for African American equality with the struggle for equality, justice, and human rights internationally (Anderson, 2003; Dudziak, 2000).

The NAACP's petition, *An Appeal to the World,* was brought before the General Assembly in 1947—before the UDHR had been drafted or approved. In it, the

NAACP highlighted the hypocrisy of both the U.S.A. and—as a result of its failings to uphold the Charter's ideals—the UN: By ignoring African Americans' denial of human rights, the UN and the U.S.A. failed to live up to the explicit declarations of human rights and racial equality outlined in the Charter and, later, the UDHR. The petition described conditions of African American life that were in clear violation of human rights, such as exclusion from elections, persecution of activists, the tolerance of lynching, sanctioned discrimination, and inadequate housing, health care, and education. The petition also directly appealed to international outrage about the Holocaust: it compared the sub-human living conditions of urban ghettoes to Jewish ghettoes; it decried the physical brutality and terrorism targeted at African Americans fighting for equal education at the same time that the U.S.A. was fighting genocide and fascism abroad; and it described American racist groups who were explicitly modeled after Nazi Storm Troopers and who used 'state's rights' to successfully defend their racism. The NAACP argued that such overt denial of human rights threatened the rights of other nations and peoples, directly opposed the work and ideals of the UN, and made a mockery of international human rights.

The final petition was submitted by the Civil Rights Congress (CRC; a Communist Party-affiliated organization; see Anderson, 2003) in 1951. *We Charge Genocide* detailed similar human rights violations as the NAACP's—including segregation, Jim Crow laws, political disenfranchisement, police and public brutality, a corrupt justice system, and statistics on quality of life differentials—but this time, it linked these violations to the Convention on Genocide:

> [A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
>
> (UN, 1948a, Article II)

The CRC argued that states, politicians, and organizations within the U.S.A. were engaged in "conspiracy to commit genocide" and "direct and public incitement to commit genocide" (UN, 1948a, Article III), both international crimes as laid out in the Convention on Genocide. Because the federal government took virtually no action to prevent these crimes of genocide, it was complicit, again an international crime according to the Convention. Appealing to the General Assembly as the "conscience of mankind" (Patterson, 1951, p. 57), the CRC argued that the entire project of the UN was undermined by U.S. violations of international treaties at home—what irony that the U.S.A. was complicit in genocide yet one of its Supreme Court justices presided over the Nuremburg Trials! The UN's Charter explicitly linked the prevention of war with the prosecution of genocide and the securing of human rights; failing to secure those rights in the U.S.A. not only made a mockery of the UN's mission, but it also threatened world peace.

Neither petition was ultimately successful in catalyzing a UN intervention; both were, in fact, actively silenced and stymied by UN leadership and even Eleanor Roosevelt herself, who was worried about embarrassing the U.S.A. and fueling Soviet critiques of the U.S.A. Despite this, the petitions *were* successful at publicly humiliating the U.S.A. for its civil and human rights violations (Anderson, 2003; Dudziak, 2000; Glendon, 2001). The language of human rights proved to be a powerful way, both domestically and internationally, to challenge U.S. inequities and injustices. This power was the very reason that Roosevelt and the other U.S. representatives worked so hard to *prevent* African Americans from linking their domestic struggle with human rights. Opponents knew that doing so might open the U.S.A. to international critique and intervention (Dudziak, 2000; Hobbins, 1998). Unfortunately, the tangle of Cold War politics eventually led the NAACP and other civil rights leaders to abandon this more powerful human rights platform for the limited equality afforded by civil rights alone—American politicians were unwilling to give any ground on human rights lest it seem to the world that they were admitting to the very criticisms Soviet Russia used against them (Dudziak, 2000). Historian Carol Anderson (2003) goes so far as to argue that the Civil Rights Movement ultimately failed because it *couldn't* maintain the human rights connection. In fact, she argues that persistent inequality in contemporary America is a *direct result* of the NAACP's abdication of a human rights platform. Inequality persists because of repeated human rights violations in education, health care, and housing—violations that "have just become part of the accepted day-to-day grind for black America" (p. 272).

Human Rights, Protest Movements, and Social Justice Principles

> "I have the audacity to believe that peoples everywhere can have three meals a day for their bodies, education and culture for their minds, and dignity, equality and freedom for their spirits. I believe that what self-centered men have torn down, men other-centered can build up. I still believe that one day mankind will . . . be crowned triumphant over war and bloodshed, and nonviolent redemptive goodwill will proclaim the rule of the land."
>
> —*Martin Luther King, Jr., Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (1964)*

Human Rights as Social Justice

While the NAACP and early civil rights leaders may have abandoned human rights, later movements actually drew on human rights in their vision of social change—both explicitly in the descriptions of their work as well as implicitly in the goals of their work, most of which correspond directly to the human rights outlined in the UDHR. For example, both Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X longed to transform the Civil Rights Movement into a human rights movement (Anderson, 2003). King wrote his "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" (1963) while imprisoned for work he was doing on behalf of the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights and spoke eloquently about the demands of the "human rights revolution" (King, 1968), while Malcolm X argued :

> The American black man is the world's most shameful case of minority oppression. . . . How is a black man going to get "civil rights" before he first wins his *human* rights? If the American black man will start thinking about his *human* rights, and then start thinking of himself as part of one of the world's greatest people, he will see he has a case for the United Nations.
>
> (original emphasis; Malcolm X & Haley, 1972, p. 207)

Malcolm X echoed earlier petitions to the UN when he argued that *human* rights superceded and subsumed civil rights. What's more, civil rights could only be granted to citizens, to *humans*, and as long as the U.S.A. continued to deny African Americans their full human rights, they would remain less-than-human in the eyes of white America, remaining persecuted and oppressed.

King and Malcolm X were not alone. In its 1966 Statement of Purpose, the National Organization of Women (NOW) declared:

> We . . . believe that the time has come for a new movement toward true equality for all women in America, and toward a fully equal partnership of the sexes, as part of the *world-wide revolution of human rights* now taking place within and beyond our national borders. . . . We realize that women's problems are linked to many broader questions of social justice; their solution will require concerted action by many groups. Therefore, convinced that human rights for all are indivisible, we expect to give active support to the common cause of equal rights for all those who suffer discrimination and deprivation.
>
> (emphasis added; Friedan, 1966)

Feminist and NOW member Gloria Steinem (1970) even went so far as to describe her own political work not as feminist, but as humanist. Within the Gay Rights Movement, two of the most active advocacy groups orient themselves to human rights—the Human Rights Campaign and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, whose mission is to "secure the full enjoyment of the human rights of all people and communities subject to discrimination or abuse on the basis of sexual orientation" (IGLHRC, 2008). Even the Gay Liberation Front, an activist/protest group that sprung up as a result of the 1969 Stonewall Riots, described their mission of promoting gay rights as intricately linked with human rights:

> We see the persecution of homosexuality as part of a general attempt to oppress all minorities and keep them powerless. Our fate is linked. . . . Therefore we declare our support as homosexuals or bisexuals for the struggles of the black, the feminist, the Spanish-American, the Indian, the Hippie, the Young, the Student, and other victims of oppression and prejudice.
>
> (Gay Liberation Front, 1969)

In this, they not only drew on the framework of human rights but also demonstrated two principles of contemporary social justice—empathy and solidarity.

Finally, Cesar Chavez described the United Farm Workers' struggle as "seek[ing] our basic, God-given rights as human beings. . . . To the growers and to all who oppose us, we say the words of Benito Juarez: 'Respect for another's right is the meaning of peace'" (UFW, 2008, par. 120). The promise and realization of human rights were central to the UFW's labor struggles.

Cultural Pluralism as Social Justice

All of the social justice movements of the twentieth century were working towards social changes codified by the UDHR. First—and perhaps most significantly—is the commitment to cultural pluralism. Given that universal human rights originated as a means of protecting humanity from the brutality of state-sponsored racism and that the UDHR names anti-discrimination as one of its guiding moral principles, human rights are fundamentally guided by cultural pluralism (Ignatieff, 2003; Osler & Starkey, 2000a/b). Certainly, this commitment often gets watered down to tolerance, but the role of diversity in human rights is more than mere anti-discrimination. As Peter Figueroa (2000) explains,

> Citizenship (in a plural society) involves commitment to the society in its diversity; openness to, and indeed solidarity with and respect for, the different other, in particular the "ethnically" different; acceptance of the basic equal worth of all people, of the rights and responsibilities of all; and a rejection of any form of exploitation, inequitable treatment or racism. (p. 57)

A social justice commitment to diversity is about more than the mere fact of difference; rather, a social justice commitment to diversity is more akin to pluralism, or "the [civic and social] engagement that creates a common society from all that plurality" (Eck, 2006). In this, social justice—like human rights—explicitly fights against discrimination. After all, the persistence of institutional racism (and sexism, able-ism, classism, and homophobia) is a direct threat to human rights and to democracy (Ignatieff, 2003; Osler & Starkey, 2000a).

In fact, many social justice protest movements grew in response to the stubborn persistence of institutional racism. In doing so, these protest movements articulated and fought for a vision of the world where cultural pluralism was realized and where diverse voices and experiences were not only honored but also made integral to civil society. For example, the American Indian Movement (AIM) states that one prong of its mission is the restoration and revival of native cultures (Wittstock & Salinas, 2008); NOW "envision[s] a world where there is recognition and respect for each person's intrinsic worth as well as the rich diversity of the various groups among us" (NOW, 1998); and UFW's Chavez warned that, "Preservation of one's own culture does not require contempt or disrespect for other cultures" (UFW, 2008). In a pluralistic society, cultural difference and disagreement are not *threats* to a socially just civil society; rather, they *enrich* and *ensure* a civil society committed to social justice.

Voice as Social Justice

A corollary to cultural pluralism is a commitment to giving voice to the weak and the oppressed. After all, at the heart of social protest movements and the UDHR—as well as social justice education—is providing "an avenue of power for the disadvantaged" (Richardson, 2000, p. 82) by allowing the claims of victims to speak louder than the claims of oppressors and by preventing the tyranny of marginalized groups (Ignatieff, 2003; Spencer, 2000). Giving voice to the weak and oppressed is *how* human rights—and ultimately, social justice—are realized. AIM works toward this end by insisting on the rights of native peoples to interpret treaties and to address the federal government (Wittstock & Salinas, 2008), while the Human Rights Campaign actively works to elect officials who will speak on behalf of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals (HRC, 2008). Perhaps Martin Luther King, Jr. (1967) describes this work most powerfully: "We are called to speak for the weak, for the voiceless, for victims of our nation and for those it calls enemy." Providing the opportunity for the voices of the less powerful to be heard is one way of fighting for that fundamental human right to self-determination. In working for self-determination, human rights and social protest are "empowering the powerless, giving voice to the voiceless" (Ignatieff, 2003, p. 70).

Economic and Social Rights as Social Justice

However, the most fundamental way in which social justice movements align with a human rights framework is in their constant demands for the economic and social rights guaranteed in the UDHR: equal pay for equal work, living wages, adequate health care, social support for the impoverished, equitable and meaningful education, and reducing the gap between rich and poor, among others. Human rights cannot be divorced from social and economic arrangements—justice and rights are inextricably linked (Witkins, 1998). As political philosopher Amy Gutmann (2003) argues, "Starving people are denied their human agency. They are also being denied their dignity, and they are being degraded. They are not being treated as agents with a human life to lead" (p. xii). Social justice movements recognized this, and so they advocated for the economic and social rights of all citizens: AIM vows to "reclaim and affirm health, housing, employment, economic development, and education for all Indian people" (Wittstock & Salinas, 2008); NOW (1998) "envision[s] a world where social and economic justice exist, where all people have the food, housing, clothing, health care and education they need"; the Gay Liberation Front (1969), after the Stonewall Riots, demanded the right of homosexuals to own their businesses and run their own organizations; the UFW struggled not merely for employment security and rights but also for the protection of the physical health of farm workers (Chavez, 1989); Martin Luther King Jr. and Myles Horton launched a Poor People's Campaign in which a "multiracial army of the poor" would demand economic justice; and the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act demanded that individuals with disabilities be afforded equal educational opportunities. All of these movements are *centrally* concerned with the litany of social and economic rights guaranteed by the UDHR.

State Action as Social Justice

Finally, these social justice movements understand the complicity of the state in perpetuating inequality—and thus the state's responsibility for eliminating inequality. As King (1967) famously declared about the war in Vietnam:

> True compassion is more than flinging a coin to a beggar; it is not haphazard and superficial. It comes to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring. A true revolution of values will soon look uneasily on the glaring contrast of poverty and wealth. With righteous indignation, it will look across the seas and see individual capitalists of the West investing huge sums of money in Asia, Africa and South America, only to take the profits out with no concern for the social betterment of the countries, and say: "This is not just."

This is precisely the perspective called for by a UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education when arguing that schools (a vehicle of the state), rather than trying to correct 'socially excluded' individuals, needed to recognize and address the 'statal' and systemic exclusions and discriminations that oppress students—to understand that 'socially excluded' students are made this way through state actions and inactions—and to understand that it is a *human rights obligation* to address these systemic inequalities (Alderson, 2000).

Clarifying Social Justice Education through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

> "Teaching for social justice might be thought of as a kind of popular education—of, by, and for the people—something that lies at the heart of education in a democracy, education toward a more vital, more muscular democratic society. It can propel us toward action, away from complacency, reminding us of the powerful commitment, persistence, bravery, and triumphs of our justice-seeking forebears—women and men who sought to build a world that worked for us all. Abolitionists, suffragettes, labor organizers, civil rights activists: Without them, liberty would today be slighter, poorer, weaker—the American flag wrapped around an empty shell—a democracy of form and symbol over substance."
>
> —*Bill Ayers, "Social Justice and Teaching" (2008)*

Given the connection between human rights and social justice and the central role of education in promoting both, social justice education can be understood as fulfilling the vision of global justice and human dignity promoted by the UDHR. To make this claim, it is important to clarify social justice education—a complicated task, as the field is often critiqued for its lack of a uniform definition. As Gloria Ladson-Billings (2006) argues, social justice education is "less a thing and more an ethical position" (p. 40).

Two theories of social justice writ large are used to frame social justice education and to clarify its ethical positions. The first is John Rawls' (1971) theory of distributive justice, which, as summarized by Cochran-Smith (2008), "focuses on

equality of individuals, civic engagement, and a common political commitment to all citizens' autonomy to pursue their own ideas of the good life" (p. 7). In this theory of distributive justice, *in*justice is rooted in macro-level, political/economic structures that cause exploitation and material deprivation and prevent self-actualization. The second framework is Nancy Fraser's (1997) dualism of the politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition. In this theory, there is the acknowledgment that injustice can stem not just from one's unfair exclusion from the macro-level political and economic order but also from the denial of one's lived experience, identity, and culture. Justice is not simply the redistribution of material resources but also the recognition and acceptance of diversity. Justice is about economic and political rights as well as pluralism.

Theories of social justice *education* build from these two frameworks. For example, Marilyn Cochran-Smith (2008) describes teaching for social justice as an intellectual approach to the inescapably political work of schooling. The three key components to her theory—equity of learning opportunities, respect for social groups, and teaching through tension—lead to the goal of promoting students' learning and enhancing their life chances. Teaching for social justice must connect "distributive justice, which locates equality and autonomy at the center of democratic societies, with current political struggles for recognition, which challenge the school and knowledge structures that reinforce the disrespect and oppression of social groups" (p. 12). Another articulation is North's (2006): If the ultimate goal of social justice is the restructuring of the political economy, or ensuring the UDHR's economic and political rights, then social justice education must "challenge the existing hierarchies of power, embracing difference [and] challenging cultural imperialism" (p. 510). Finally, Grant and Agosto (2008) describe social justice as the ultimate *aim* of education, where social justice is a regulative system of fairness that ensures the security of citizens, pushes for distributive equality and interrogates why distributive inequalities exist, and aims for the elimination of institutionalized domination. Social justice education is, ultimately, "education for freedom," where the promotion of basic human rights and dignity fosters social change: "Teaching for social justice is teaching that arouses students, engages them in a quest to identify obstacles to their full humanity, to their freedom, and then to drive, to move against those obstacles. And so the fundamental message of the teacher for social justice is: You can change the world" (Ayers, 1998, p. xvii). By embracing cultural differences and promoting pluralism, by challenging cultural imperialism and unequal hierarchies of power, by interrogating material inequalities and advocating for economic justice, and by equipping students with the skills necessary to be active democratic citizens, social justice education is working for a world that honors fundamental human rights. At its core, social justice education builds on Rawls's (1971) notion of self-actualization to enact an education that promotes "the full development of the human personality" (UDHR, 1948, 26.2).

In fact, social justice education attempts to realize the UDHR's vision for education—to educate about basic human rights and fundamental human dignity, to foster the dispositions and attitudes that protect human rights, and to allow for individuals' self-actualization and personal development. In realizing this vision,

social justice education emphasizes equipping students with the tools necessary to fulfill their democratic responsibilities (Ayers, 2008; Cochran-Smith, 2008; Grant & Agosto, 2008), with one of the central tools being critical thinking (Applebaum, 2008; Cochran-Smith, 2008; Gutmann, 1999; Gutstein, 2005). This critical thinking is honed through curricular attention to inequality, injustice, and the violation of rights. For example, in Eric Gutstein's (2008; and see Chapter 14 in this volume) high school math classes, his students apply mathematical knowledge, such as probability, to current events. In one example, his students determined the statistical likelihood that the black defendants in the Jena 6 case could have 'randomly' received the all-white juries that they did. In social justice pedagogy, the central purpose of educational content—literacy, numeracy, scientific and historical inquiry, the arts—is to raise students' critical consciousness and to help them become advocates for justice and human rights.

This is, after all, the precise role of education laid out in the UDHR. As a former Director General of UNESCO explained, "Education for human rights and democracy in the last analysis means the empowerment of each and every individual to participate with an active sense of responsibility in all aspects of political and social life" (Spencer, 2000, p. 28). Education for human rights—like Ayers's (2008) description of social justice education as "the heart of education in a democracy, education toward a more vital, more muscular democratic society"—is committed to preparing students for a deliberative democracy that values diversity, social responsibility, and human rights. This education becomes a means of resisting systemic inequality and discrimination. In fact, this articulation of "education for freedom"—or education that encourages students to examine their world with empathy and an eye towards justice—was central to Eleanor Roosevelt's vision of human rights (Harevan, 1968). She explained this role:

> Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home—so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person; the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, farm, or office where he works. Such are the places where every man, woman and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere.
>
> (UN Department of Public Information, 1997, par. 7)

For Roosevelt, schools were both the seedbeds for and the ultimate realization of human rights, where citizens first learned about and first experienced human rights. This, according to Glendon (2001), is what is most striking about the UDHR: "[T]he most remarkable feature of the Declaration [is] its attention to the 'small places' where people first learn about their rights and how to exercise them responsibly—families, schools, workplaces, and religious associations" (p. 240). Without these 'small places,' human rights and social justice will never be realized.

Conclusion: Social Justice and Human Rights Education in an Era of Globalization

In the post-World War II context, the NAACP understood that white supremacy transcended national borders. The treatment of African Americans at home was intimately linked to colonial and imperial domination the world over (Anderson, 2003). Their insight into the internationalism of oppression rings even more true today. In an era of globalization—an era of the "primacy of property rights over human rights" (Sleeter, 2008, p. 144)[5]—a social justice framework has become even more critical: promoting equality, justice, and human dignity is necessary for challenging global imperialism. But when both George Bush (Office of the Press Secretary, 2007) and Bill Ayers (2008) can claim 'social justice' as central to their work, it is obvious the term needs clarification. Historicizing social justice in terms of human rights can clarify this politically contested term—as well as the ultimate aims of social justice education.

In particular, a human rights framework explicitly and importantly challenges the prevailing view that twenty-first century education is solely for market preparation and for serving the needs of capital (Grant & Grant, 2007; Lipman, 2001; Sleeter, 2008). Instead, in the language of human rights and in the aims of social justice, we see a mandate—an *international* mandate—for education that contributes to self-realization, to respect for human rights, and to a flourishing and whole life. This vision not only reframes education as a public good rather than a marketable commodity, but it also demands that education be directed toward cultivating an informed and democratic citizenry. Education for citizenship was central to Thomas Jefferson's vision of American democracy, and it remains especially crucial today. Human rights and social justice education can empower citizens to contest the marketization of their education, their democracies, and themselves (Grant & Grant, 2007). Indeed, human rights—as framed by the UDHR, as reinvigorated by the aforementioned social protest movements, and as advocated for today—explicitly challenges the primacy of capital over human dignity and social justice, instead asserting the basic human right to a living wage, an adequate standard of living, and social security, as well as the *state's responsibility to protect and provide for these rights.* Human rights become a powerful antidote to unbridled capitalism and imperialist greed.

Finally, by grounding social justice in the language of human rights, we are also reminded of the promises of our globalized world—of the interconnectedness of world citizens (Blackmore, 2000), of the possibilities of cosmopolitanism to triumph over nativism (Appiah, 2003; Parker, 2004), of the internationalism of struggles for social justice (Apple and Buras, 2006; Maran, 1999)—and of the ways that education can attend to and build on these promises through multicultural curricula and pedagogy promoting pluralism, equality, and human rights.

Whether looking at worsening living conditions for America's growing lower classes (Anyon, 2005), the increasing poverty of the world's poorest nations and citizens (Ishay, 2004), the far-reaching social and economic effects of globalization (Lipman, 2001), the enduring armed conflicts of the world, or the persistence of genocide, it is clear that we have not yet achieved the vision of social justice set out

by the Human Rights Commission. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s (1967) words still ring true: "These are revolutionary times. All over the globe men are revolting against old systems of exploitation and oppression, and out of the wombs of a frail world, new systems of justice and equality are being born." We are *still* working for "the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want . . . the highest aspiration of the common people" (UN, 1948b, Preamble).

Points of Inquiry

- How did the shift from human rights to civil rights affect the discourses surrounding the rights of minority groups?
- Why is it important to provide students with a sense of history or histories when discussing social justice?
- How does the UN document on human rights align or challenge current issues of globalization, the environment, and other social issues?
- Let's look at how this chapter speaks to various content areas:
    - Social Studies: history, international education, democracy, studying the UN
    - English/Language Arts: national and international perspectives of writers' interpretations of what it means to be human, maintain a democracy, be a citizen
    - Arts/music: artistic interpretations of struggle and humanity; the role(s) the arts play in humanity and humanness, art/music history studies of period artists, art as protest
    - Science: ethical considerations for science, the history of human rights abuse in the name of science, institutional review boards (IRBs) as an example of the protection of human rights, use of scientific inquiry to resolve human rights atrocities
    - Math: statistics and data analysis of human rights abuses and their outcomes.

Points of Praxis

- Use the documents in the chapter to build a lesson plan on primary sources.
- Read human rights declarations from around the world as part of a unit of globalization.
- Read auto/biographies of the Roosevelts.
- Debate the currency of the document today.
- Apply the document to current conflicts: Who is in violation of the UN decree? Who is protecting human rights? Debate both sides of the conflict.

Notes

1 While we are focusing on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), there were two human rights documents written and ratified at the UN from 1945–1948: the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the UDHR. The UDHR was written as a statement of general human rights aims without reference to enforcement; its supplemental, legally binding treaties on human rights—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (referred to jointly as the Covenants)—were written in 1966 (Glendon, 2001).

2 The naming of Hitler's genocide of European Jewry as the Holocaust is contested. On the one hand, "holocaust" is the English translation for the Hebrew word given to this tragedy, *Shoah*—a word that, in Hebrew, came to be the proper noun naming this genocide. On the other hand, other groups subjected to genocide contest the claiming of the word "holocaust" by a single people. Out of respect for other genocides—most of which receive far less media, historical, or political attention—some refer to specific Holocausts: the Jewish Holocaust, the Rwandan Holocaust, the African Holocaust. Yet this, too, is contested, and can be seen as a means of diminishing the catastrophic consequences of anti-Semitism. We recognize both sides of this complicated debate; we understand that the naming of history has real political and social consequences. However, given the World War II context of this chapter, we will refer to this genocide as the Holocaust. Our editors disagree with this choice.

3 Concurrent to the Human Rights Commission's work on drafting an "international bill of rights," the United Nations Educational and Scientific Committee (UNESCO) set about surveying philosophers, politicians, scholars, scientists, and educators the world over in order to determine if there even were such a thing as *universal* human rights. UNESCO collected its responses and submitted them to the Human Rights Commission as evidence that there were, indeed, universal human rights; as guidance as to what those universal rights were; and as a warning about the limits of crafting a universal declaration. While the Human Rights Commission did not use UNESCO's survey in its drafting process, most of UNESCO's findings correspond to the final UDHR (Glendon, 2001; UNESCO, 1949).

4 Two distinct rights traditions are codified in rights documents. The first tradition, Western civil rights, is associated with the British, French, and American revolutionary documents; civil rights protect property, life, and liberty as well as the freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly. In this tradition, the emphasis is on "individual liberty and initiative more than equality or social solidarity and was infused with a greater mistrust of government" (Glendon, 2001, p. xvii). On the other hand, dignitarian rights—also referred to as second-generation rights—emphasize equality, fraternity, and collective responsibility, balancing individual liberties with social responsibility. The state plays an active role in guaranteeing rights as well as protecting and providing for the needy. Dignitarian rights include the right to work, to education, and to basic subsistence. This tradition is most associated with social democracies such as in Scandinavia and Latin America (Glendon, 2001; Ishay, 2004; Morsink, 1999).

5 We define globalization as the process of "increased economic, cultural, environmental, and social interdependencies and new transnational financial and political formation arising out of the mobility of capital, labor and information, with both homogenizing and differentiating tendencies" (Blackmore, 2000, p. 33). More specifically, globalization is characterized by the growing international centrality of capital markets and by the reframing of "all social relations, all forms of knowledge and culture in terms of the market," with "[a]ll human production and all sites of social intercourse, all services that a society establishes for the common good . . . potential targets for investment and profit making" (Lipman, 2001). We recognize that there are multiple globalizations, ranging from cultural and technological exchange to neo-liberal expansion (Santos, 2002; Sleeter, 2003). In all, we see two trends: Increased economic inequality and the increased possibility for trans-national social protest.

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